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ABSTRACT
District of Columbia v. Heller was a landmark ruling in which the Supreme
Court established that citizens have a constitutional right to possess firearms in
their homes for self-protection. The 5-4 decision—along with the Court’s
subsequent ruling in McDonald v. Chicago—upended the prevailing wisdom
that the Second Amendment protected the right of the states to assemble militias
for collective security. In this Article, we examine the effects of these rulings on
gun regulation in the United States and, more to the point, on gun politics. We
situate our analysis within several related theoretical frameworks, most notably
those focused on policy feedback and on the role of courts in producing social
change. We argue that the effects of Heller (together with the parallel decision
in McDonald) have been rather limited. We examine the rulings’ first-order
effects on pre-existing gun control laws, as well as second-order effects on a
number of related outcomes. We find that Heller and its progeny have had
generally small or non-existent impacts on gun policy, on the organizational
capacities and political strategies of pro-gun and pro-regulation groups, and on
public attitudes toward gun regulation. Our findings support a constrained view
of the Court’s ability to drive social and political change. We conclude,
however, by noting that recent developments—particularly hints that some
Supreme Court Justices are eager to develop Second Amendment
jurisprudence—have the potential to alter these conclusions.
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INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its landmark ruling
in District of Columbia v. Heller.1 The ruling struck down several of the city’s
strict gun laws, including an effective ban on possession of functional
handguns.2 For the first time, the Court ruled that citizens have a constitutional
right to possess such a firearm in the home for self-protection.3 The Court
majority cautioned that the Second Amendment, like other constitutional rights,
is not unlimited.4 But the 5-4 decision upended the prevailing wisdom that the
Second Amendment only protected the right of the states to assemble militias
for collective security.5 In doing so, the ruling endorsed a perspective on guns
and citizenship that legal scholars (including some liberals) and pro-gun
advocates had been developing for many years.6
In the contentious world of gun politics, Heller was a momentous ruling.
Pundits on all sides of the gun debate rushed to weigh in. Wayne LaPierre, Chief
Executive of the National Rifle Association (NRA), called the decision “a great
moment in American history.”7 Ironically, the nation’s largest gun rights
organization had declined to bring the lawsuit that resulted in the Heller
decision; the organization’s reluctance stemmed in part from a lack of certainty
that it would prevail.8 Aside from the strategic desire to avoid a legal loss,
however, the NRA may also have had a political desire to avoid a win in front
of the country’s highest court.9 After all, the organization’s ability to mobilize
its members into politics had relied on claims that gun rights were threatened
with extinction.10 Such appeals may have lost credibility if the Court chose to
protect an individual constitutional right to own guns.11 Nevertheless, even

1

554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
Id.
3
Id. at 636.
4
Id. at 626–27.
5
ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN AMERICA 95–97, 105–
13 (2011).
6
DAVID COLE, ENGINES OF LIBERTY: THE POWER OF CITIZEN ACTIVISTS TO MAKE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 118–19 (2016); WINKLER, supra note 5, at 105–13.
7
Heller: The Supreme Decision, NRA-ILA (June 27, 2008), https://www.nraila.org/articles/20080627/
heller.
8
WINKLER, supra note 5, at 56–58, 60 (noting that the NRA brought a parallel lawsuit pursuing what
the organization saw as a safer legal strategy).
9
Id. at 57.
10
Id. at 57–58.
11
Id. at 58.
2
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though it had not brought the lawsuit, the NRA was publicly happy to embrace
the Heller ruling.12
Less pleased were political leaders favoring stricter gun laws. For example,
Chicago Mayor Richard Daley called Heller “a very frightening decision.”13 In
1982, Chicago had instituted a “freeze” on civilian handgun possession,
meaning that people wishing to acquire and possess a handgun thereafter were
effectively barred from doing so. In addition, several Chicago suburbs had
banned handguns. Daley’s comment turned out to be prescient. Two years later,
using Heller as precedent, an equally divided Supreme Court ruled these policies
unconstitutional in the case of McDonald v. City of Chicago.14
While the NRA rejoiced, and Mayor Daley feared the worst, longtime gun
control advocacy groups glimpsed a silver lining amid the clouds.15 To their eye,
the Court had signaled that virtually all common gun restrictions would still pass
constitutional muster.16 What is more, by reinforcing that the Constitution
protected gun owners, the Court might have deflated the gun rights lobby’s
argument that any new gun law could result in firearms confiscation and open
the door to tyranny.17 By undermining the “slippery slope” narrative, some gun
control advocates thought, the Court might have created space for bipartisan
compromise on firearms policy.18 As the chief of the Brady Campaign to Prevent
Gun Violence put it, “[t]he Court . . . rejected the absolutist meaning of the 2nd
Amendment. [Gun restrictions] can now be debated on their merits without
distractions of fear or ideology.”19
Each of these perspectivesfrom a gun rights lobbyist, an anti-gun
politician, and a gun control organizationserves as a hypothesis for the
question at hand: What did Heller do? The array of viewpoints described above
highlights both the importance of understanding the ruling’s downstream effects

See Heller: The Supreme Decision, supra note 7 (publicly supporting the Heller ruling).
Alex Altman, The Future of Gun Control, TIME (June 26, 2008), http://content.time.com/time/nation/
article/0,8599,1818325,00.html.
14
561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010).
15
Chris Good, Interview: Brady Campaign President Paul Helmke on Why the Gun Ruling Isn’t So Bad,
ATLANTIC (June 28, 2010), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/06/interview-brady-campaignpresident-paul-helmke-on-why-the-gun-ruling-isnt-so-bad/58849/ (explaining that the McDonald ruling was a
very narrow ruling).
16
See id.; Altman, supra note 13.
17
See, e.g., Altman, supra note 13.
18
Paul Helmke, My Formal Statement in the Heller DC Gun Case, Plus Remarks in Front of the Supreme
Court, HUFFPOST. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/my-formal-statement-on-to_b_109492 (last updated Dec. 6,
2017).
19
Id.
12
13
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and the lack of obvious expectations about what these effects might be. In this
Article, we assemble a wide range of empirical evidence to examine the ruling’s
impact on firearm laws and on elite- and mass-level gun politics. We situate our
analysis within a number of related theoretical frameworks, most notably those
focused on policy feedback and on the courts as engines of political change.
We argue that the effects of Heller (together with the parallel decision in
McDonald) have, in general, been rather limited. We examine the ruling’s firstorder effects on preexisting gun control laws, as well as its second-order effects
on a number of related outcomes. We find that the ruling has had generally small
or nonexistent impacts on gun policy, legislative agendas, the organizational
capacities and political strategies of pro-gun and pro-regulation groups, and
public attitudes about gun regulation. Our findings support a constrained view
of the Court’s ability to drive social and political change. We conclude, however,
by noting that recent developments have the potential to alter our conclusions
moving forward.
I.

THE (HOLLOW?) HOPE: GUN RIGHTS, FEEDBACK EFFECTS ON POLITICS,
AND THE CONSTRAINED COURT

In the context of constitutional jurisprudence, court rulings are tantamount
to statements of public policy. As such, they might be expected to have what we
will call first-order and second-order effects on policymaking and politics. Firstorder effects can be thought of as the direct and foreseeable impacts of a ruling
on public policy. They might include the repeal or revision of unconstitutional
statutes or regulations; state imposition of incentives or costs to induce
compliance with the court ruling; and changes in social or economic behavior in
response to the ruling.20 These are the conventional ways that court rulings are
understood to have influence—as striking down (or upholding) laws and
reordering (or not) state and social practices associated with these laws.21
But court rulings as statements of public policy might have second-order
effects, as wellnamely, on the political dynamics surrounding the issue at
hand.22 Such impacts are known as “policy feedback” effects.23 Feedback theory

20
See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 9–36
(1991). See generally R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES: INTERPRETING WELFARE RIGHTS (1994).
21
ROSENBERG, supra note 20, at 9–36.
22
See Suzanne Mettler & Mallory SoRelle, Policy Feedback Theory, in THEORIES OF THE POLICY
PROCESS 103–34 (Christopher M. Weibe & Paul A. Sabatier eds., 4th ed. 2018); Paul Pierson, When Effect
Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political Change, 45 WORLD POL. 595, 599 (1993).
23
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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holds that policies may affect citizens’ political capacity, their stake in defending
or challenging the state, and their sense of civic inclusion or status.24 Policies
may also operate through political organizations, shaping their capacity to
mediate between the state and the citizenry.25 For example, policies may support
organizations in their roles as incubators of civic skills, as fora for civic
inclusion, as arenas for political recruitment, as amplifiers of political influence,
and as mobilizers of collective action. Policies may work on organizations to
frustrate these goals, as well.26 Finally, policies may have feedback effects on
political elites, who learn from public policy and make decisions based on this
learning.27
While most policy feedback work emphasizes positive cycles, whereby
policy shapes subsequent political attitudes and behaviors, feedback effects do
not occur in all cases and are often contingent on particular conditions being
met.28 In some cases, policies can even produce negative feedback, in which
24
See, e.g., R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION (1990); ANDREA LOUISE
CAMPBELL, HOW POLICIES MAKE CITIZENS: SENIOR POLITICAL ACTIVISM AND THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE
(2003); AMY E. LERMAN & VESLA M. WEAVER, ARRESTING CITIZENSHIP: THE DEMOCRATIC CONSEQUENCES OF
AMERICAN CRIME CONTROL (2014); SUZANNE METTLER, SOLDIERS TO CITIZENS: THE G.I. BILL AND THE
MAKING OF THE GREATEST GENERATION (2005); SUZANNE METTLER, THE SUBMERGED STATE: HOW INVISIBLE
GOVERNMENT POLICIES UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2011); DEONDRA ROSE, CITIZENS BY DEGREE:
HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY AND THE CHANGING GENDER DYNAMICS OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2018); E. E.
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURES, AND THE TARIFF (1935); THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS
AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 58–59 (1992); Mettler &
SoRelle, supra note 22, at 103–34; Suzanne Mettler & Joe Soss, The Consequences of Public Policy for
Democratic Citizenship: Bridging Policy Studies and Mass Politics, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 55, 60 (2004); Pierson,
supra note 22, at 599; Anne Schneider & Helen Ingram, The Social Construction of Target Populations:
Implications for Politics and Policy, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 334, 338–39 (1993); Joe Soss, Lessons of Welfare:
Policy Design, Political Learning, and Political Action, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 363, 364 (1999).
25
See generally IRENE BLOEMRAAD, BECOMING A CITIZEN: INCORPORATING IMMIGRANTS AND
REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 161–88 (2006); KRISTIN A. GOSS, THE PARADOX OF GENDER
EQUALITY: HOW AMERICAN WOMEN’S GROUPS GAINED AND LOST THEIR PUBLIC VOICE (2012); CHLOE N.
THURSTON, AT THE BOUNDARIES OF HOME OWNERSHIP: CREDIT, DISCRIMINATION, AND THE AMERICAN STATE
(2018); JACK L. WALKER JR., MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICA: PATRONS, PROFESSIONS, AND SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS (1991); Kristin A. Goss, Civil Society and Civic Engagement: Toward a Multilevel Theory of
Policy Feedbacks, 6 J. CIV. SOC’Y 119, 123 (2010); Kristin A. Goss, Carolyn Barnes & Deondra Rose, Bringing
Organizations Back In: MultiLevel Feedback Effects on Individual Civic Inclusion, 47 POL’Y STUD. J. 451, 452
(2019); Matthew Lacombe, Gunning for the Masses: How the NRA Has Shaped Its Supporters’ Behavior,
Advanced Its Political Agenda, and Thwarted the Will of the Majority (Mar. 2019) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Northwestern University) (on file with author).
26
Goss, Barnes & Rose, supra note 25, at 463.
27
Peter A. Hall, Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State, 25 COMP. POL. 275, 288–90 (1993);
Pierson, supra note 24, at 610. See generally HUGH HECLO, MODERN SOCIAL POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND SWEDEN
(1974).
28
Daniel J. Galvin & Chloe N. Thurston, The Democrats’ Misplaced Faith in Policy Feedback, 15
FORUM 333, 334–35 (2017); see also Joe Soss & Sanford F. Schram, A Public Transformed? Welfare Reform as
Policy Feedback, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 111, 114 (2007); Soss, supra note 24, at 376. See generally METTLER,
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policies contain self-undermining features that contribute to their own demise.29
These findings suggest that even major policies may not produce significant and
durable political effects.
Whether examining the mass, organizational, or elite level, policy feedback
theory predicts that policies have the potential to reshape politics. Policy
feedback constitutes a growing area of inquiry among social scientists.30
Interestingly, however, feedback theory has developed almost exclusively
through studies of distributive, redistributive, and regulatory policies developed
by legislatures and implemented by executive agencies and their nonprofit
contractors and grantees.31 There has been very little thought given to the courts
as producers of public policy with the potential to produce feedback effects on
politics.
An early and prominent exception is the work of Gerald Rosenberg.32 His
important book The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? was
published just as political science was rediscovering early insights about
policy’s effects on politics,33 organizing these works under the rubric of policy
feedback, and building a new body of work. Without using the term “feedback
effects,” Rosenberg was adding to this literature.
Particularly relevant for our purposes, Rosenberg explores whether the
seminal Supreme Court ruling in Brown v. Board of Education altered the
politics of civil rights in America.34 Rosenberg’s primary concern is with the
ruling’s first-order effects—whether Brown desegregated the public schools.35
Finding no evidence that it did, Rosenberg asks whether the ruling might have
produced second-order, political impacts of the sort that scholars now term

supra note 24.
29
ERIC M. PATASHNIK, REFORMS AT RISK: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER MAJOR POLICY REFORMS ARE
ENACTED 2–3, 32 (2008); Alan M. Jacobs & R. Kent Weaver, When Policies Undo Themselves: SelfUndermining Feedback as a Source of Policy Change, 28 GOVERNANCE 441, 443 (2015); Eric M. Patashnik,
Limiting Policy Backlash: Strategies for Taming Countercoalitions in an Era of Polarization, 685 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 47, 48 (2019); Eric M. Patashnik & Julian E. Zelizer, The Struggle to Remake Politics:
Liberal Reform and the Limits of Policy Feedback in the Contemporary American State, 11 PERSP. ON POL.
1071, 1072, 1077, 1083 (2013).
30
Mettler & SoRelle, supra note 24, at 104.
31
See generally CAMPBELL, supra note 98; Mettler & Soss, supra note 24; Mettler & SoRelle, supra note
24.
32
GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
33
See, e.g., SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 24, at 283; Theodore J. Lowi, American Business, Public
Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory, 16 WORLD POL. 677, 677 (1964).
34
ROSENBERG, supra note 32, at 40.
35
Id. at 39–54.
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policy feedback effects.36 He explores a number of logical possibilities,
including a boost to the civil rights movement,37 increases in African-American
voter registration, a rise in civil rights bills and co-sponsorships citing the
ruling,38 reductions in racist attitudes among the general public,39 changes in
textbooks’ portrayals of African-Americans,40 and so forth. Again, the data show
few if any such effects.41 Put in terms of feedback theory, he reached a series of
null findings.
Rosenberg sees these findings as evidence for the “constrained court” view
of the judiciary’s influence.42 In this view, courts in and of themselves are
seldom agents of social change.43 The constrained court perspective stands in
contrast to the “dynamic court” view, which places more faith in courts’
influence.44 The constrained court perspective finds support in Federalist 78, in
which Alexander Hamilton argued that the Supreme Court’s impact would be
limited because it had neither the sword—that is, authority to enforce
implementation of its rulings—nor the purse—that is, financial resources to
encourage compliance.45 Rosenberg returns to these insights to argue that
interest groups and social movements expect too much from the Court and that,
indeed, such contemporary expectations are historically “odd.”46 Stating that
courts provide a “hollow hope” to reformers, Rosenberg argues that “[w]hat is
radical is the belief that litigation can produce significant social reform, that
rights triumph over politics.”47 Rosenberg concedes that the Court can facilitate
significant reform under certain conditions,48 but his analysis casts doubt on the
capacity of rulings to produce substantial change on their own.
Drawing on Rosenberg’s approach and policy feedback theory more
broadly, we assess whether Heller and its progeny had political or policy impacts
beyond the first-order, geographically delineated effects on the specific types of
laws implicated in the rulings. We investigate effects in three broad categories:
(1) laws and other indicators of policymakers’ agendas; (2) the political capacity
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Id. at 40–41.
Id. at 131–56.
Id. at 124.
Id. at 125–31.
Id. at 116.
Id. at 155.
Id. at 157.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 22.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
ROSENBERG, supra note 32, at 430.
Id.
Id. at 431.
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and strategies of advocacy organizations; and (3) mass attitudes. With one
exception, we find that these decisions had somewhere between minimal and no
effects. The exception is that Heller and its progeny led gun groups to increase
their use of litigation (largely unsuccessfully) to achieve legal and social change.
Viewed as a whole, the evidence presented here suggests that roughly a decade
after they were decided, Heller and its progeny have delivered more symbolic
assurances than tangible outcomes.
II. WHAT DID HELLER DO? THE RULING’S DIRECT EFFECTS ON LAW
AND POLICY
Heller was the first Supreme Court ruling to find a constitutional protection
for private gun ownership.49 It invalidated several District of Columbia gun laws
that, combined, effectively prohibited the possession of a functional firearm in
the home.50 Under the Firearms Control Regulations Act of 1975, the District
barred the possession, sale, or transfer of handguns, except those that had been
registered before the law went into effect (September 24, 1976) and then
reregistered within sixty days thereafter.51 Under the law, any firearm kept at
home, including long guns, had to be stored unloaded and disassembled or
secured by a trigger lock.52 Writing for the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia
found that these laws violated the Second Amendment,53 which reads, “A well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”54 Drawing on seventeenth
and eighteenth century English history, early state right-to-bear-arms provisions,
and eighteenth century semantic conventions, Justice Scalia reasoned that the
founders understood the amendment to enshrine a broad right of self-defense,
irrespective of people’s service in the militia.55 The ruling established the core
legal principles and an ambiguous framework for evaluating Second
Amendment challenges to American gun laws at the local, state, and federal
levels.56
49
Robert Barnes, Justices Reject D.C. Ban on Handgun Ownership, WASH. POST (June 27, 2008),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/26/AR2008062600615.html.
50
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 574–75 (2008).
51
Edward D. Jones III, The District of Columbia’s “Firearms Control Regulations Act of 1975”: The
Toughest Handgun Control Law in the United States—or Is It?, 455 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 138,
139 (1981). The Act became D.C. Law 1-85. Id.
52
Id. at 140.
53
Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
54
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
55
Heller, 554 U.S. at 606–11.
56
See Pena v. Lindley, 898 F.3d 969, 975 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that the court’s Second Amendment
analysis is “is framed by a two-step inquiry established in Heller”); Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, From Theory
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Heller also served as the foundation for a handful of especially salient progun rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court (McDonald v. City of Chicago, 2010),57
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Moore v. Madigan,
2012),58 by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (Palmer v.
District of Columbia, 2014),59 and by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit (Wrenn v. District of Columbia and Grace v. District of Columbia, both
in 2017).60 This small handful of rulings had significant but geographically
limited effects in three areas: Washington, D.C.; Chicago and its environs; and
certain enclaves of San Francisco.
Within a few weeks of Heller, the D.C. City Council repealed the District’s
ban on handguns but passed legislation requiring that firearms be kept locked,
unloaded, or disassembled unless there was a “threat of immediate harm to a
person” within the home.61 The storage requirement later was downgraded to a
recommendation,62 but D.C. gun laws remain among the most restrictive in the
nation.63 They require that firearms be registered with the police; that the
registrant not be subject to standard federal prohibitors or have a recent history
of violent behavior or of firearms negligence causing death or injury; and that
the registrant take precautions to prevent minors from accessing any loaded
firearm on the premises.64
Besides these changes to D.C.’s firearms law, Heller led to the swift repeal
of handgun bans in four Chicago suburbs—Evanston, Morton Grove, Wilmette,
and Winnetka—as well as in public housing complexes operated by the City of
San Francisco.65 Heller also served as a precedent for a second Supreme Court
case, McDonald v. City of Chicago, which extended Heller’s individual-rights
holding to jurisdictions beyond the federal capital.66 The ruling struck down

to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms After Heller, 67 DUKE L.J. 1433, 1439–
42 (2018).
57
McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 749–50 (2010).
58
Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935 (7th Cir. 2012).
59
Palmer v. District of Columbia, 59 F. Supp. 3d 173, 178 (D.D.C. 2014).
60
Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
61
Nikita Stewart & Bill Turque, D.C. Gun Ban Is Out, but Regulations Stay, WASH. POST, July 16, 2008,
at B1.
62
Firearm Registration General Requirements—Study Guide, METRO. POLICE DEP’T, https://mpdc.dc.
gov/page/firearm-registration-general-requirements-study-guide (last visited Feb. 7, 2020).
63
District of Columbia Gun Laws, GIFFORDS L. CTR., https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/statelaw/district-of-columbia/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2020).
64
Firearm Registration, supra note 62.
65
David B. Kopel, Gun Rights and the Constitution: Was Heller Insignificant?, CATO INST. (Mar. 26,
2009), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/gun-rights-constitution-was-heller-insignificant.
66
McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010).
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Chicago’s longstanding handgun freeze.67 A twenty-five-year-old ban on assault
weapons in Cook County, which includes Chicago and many of its suburbs,
remains in place.68 The McDonald ruling also led a fifth Chicago suburb, Oak
Park, to repeal its handgun ban.69
The precedent set by Heller and reinforced by McDonald extended to three
especially important rulings at the district court and circuit court levels. In
Moore v. Madigan, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated Illinois’
ban on the carrying of concealed firearms in public.70 The law had carved out
exceptions for certain categories of people (e.g., law enforcement officers,
hunters, shooting-club members) and for certain locations (e.g., on private
property, in one’s home, at a fixed place of business).71 But even with these
provisions, it had been the strictest state law in the nation.72 After Moore, Illinois
joined the ranks of “shall issue” states, meaning that law enforcement must grant
concealed carry licenses to people who meet basic legal requirements (e.g., they
are not disqualified from owning a firearm).73 That said, Illinois law includes a
process whereby law enforcement officers who fear that an applicant may pose
a threat to himself or others may take their concerns to a review board, which
has the power to deem the applicant ineligible to obtain the license.74
Heller also had an effect on gun laws that the District of Columbia enacted
to replace the unconstitutional handgun ban. In Palmer v. District of Columbia,
for example, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia struck
down the city’s relatively new ban on the carrying of concealed firearms.75 In
response to the Palmer ruling, the Council amended its concealed-carry law to
grant licenses to citizens who could demonstrate “good reason” to fear injury to
themselves or their property, based on “special need” grounded in “specific
threats or previous attacks.”76 In Wrenn v. District of Columbia (2017) and its
Id.
Jonah Meadows, Cook County Assault Weapons Ban Upheld by Federal Appeals Court, PATCH (Aug.
30, 2019, 12:18 PM), https://patch.com/10llinois/highlandpark/cook-county-assault-weapons-ban-upheldfederal-appeals-court.
69
Oak Park Gun Laws: Gun Advocates Say Suburb Developing ‘Blueprint’ for Statewide Crackdown,
HUFFPOST (Jan. 25, 2012, 12:01 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/oak-park-gun-laws-gun-adv_n_1230
947.
70
Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012).
71
Id. at 934.
72
Moore v. Madigan: Law Center Files Briefs in Significant Second Amendment Cases, GIFFORDS L.
CTR. (June 13, 2012), https://lawcenter.giffords.org/tag/moore-v-madigan/.
73
Firearm Concealed Carry Act, 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 66/10 (West Supp. 2015).
74
Firearm Concealed Carry Act, 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 66/20(g) (West 2014).
75
Palmer v. District of Columbia, 59 F. Supp. 3d 173, 183 (D.D.C. 2014).
76
Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting D.C. Code Ann. § 767
68
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companion case, Grace v. District of Columbia (2017), the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals struck down the “good reason” law on the grounds that it effectively
deprived most residents of their Second Amendment right to carry in selfdefense.77
To the question, “What did Heller and its progeny do?” the first and most
direct answer is that they struck down blanket bans on handgun possession and
carrying in a handful of jurisdictions. However, these bans had always been
anomalous, representing the far reaches of modern gun control efforts.78 What
is more, these laws stood out as particularly anachronistic in an era when the
federal government and many states had been moving for a decade or more to
deregulate firearms.79 Finally, these laws also had limited reach. The District of
Columbia, San Francisco, and Illinois are home to about 4–5% of the U.S.
population,80 and only a fraction of this number would have been directly
affected by the newly relaxed gun laws (meaning people would now choose to
exercise Second Amendment rights previously denied to them).81
Thus, Heller and its progeny had an immediate effect on public policy that
was real yet quite geographically limited. However, the previously discussed
theories of public policy—of which court rulings are a form—counsel us to look
for effects beyond those that are immediately visible.
III. POLICY FEEDBACK & POLICY LEARNING: EFFECTS ON LAWMAKERS
Beyond its first-order effects, rulings like Heller may also produce less
direct, second-order effects that can restructure the political strategies and
attitudes of lawmakers, advocacy groups, and even the mass public. In this Part,

2059.11(1)(A) (West 2015)).
77
Id. at 667; Grace v. District of Columbia, No. 15-2234, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171367, at *2–3 (D.D.C.
Oct. 17, 2017).
78
PHILIP J. COOK & KRISTIN A. GOSS, THE GUN DEBATE: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 95 (2014).
79
KRISTIN A. GOSS, DISARMED: THE MISSING MOVEMENT FOR GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 10, 197
(2006).
80
See QuickFacts: United States; District of Columbia; San Francisco City, California; Illinois, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US,DC,sanfranciscocitycalifornia,IL/PST04
5219 (last visited Feb. 22, 2020).
81
See JOHN R. LOTT JR., CRIME PREVENTION RESEARCH CENTER, CONCEALED CARRY PERMIT HOLDERS
ACROSS THE UNITED STATES: 2017 29 (2017) (noting that there were 243,254 active concealed carry permits in
Illinois as of May 31, 2017); U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., SAN FRANCISCO HOUSING AUTHORITY: FIVE
YEAR PLAN 2016–2021, at 5 (2013) (noting that there are approximately 6,100 public housing units); District of
Columbia Gun Laws, GIFFORDS L. CTR., https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/state-law/district-of-columbia/
(last visited Feb. 22, 2020) (noting that even though handguns are now legal, the licensing requirements remain
strict).
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we examine the feedback effects of Heller and progeny on the actions of
lawmakers.
If policy has feedback effects on politics, one should expect to detect such
effects on the behavior of political elites. One such effect is policy learning. As
formulated by Hugh Heclo, Peter Hall, and Paul Pierson, among others, learning
typically refers to the process by which policies produce lessons of success and
failure that shape policymakers’ decisions about how to amend or perhaps
discard a given law or regulation.82 Although not conventionally part of the
literature on policy learning, court rulings may offer lessons to policymakers
about what kinds of policies are possible, desirable, or forbidden.
What did policymakers learn from Heller? As discussed above, lawmakers
and implementing agencies in the three affected jurisdictions discarded
unconstitutional laws or, in most cases, replaced them with regulations believed
to be in conformity with the courts’ interpretation of the Second Amendment.
Perhaps a more interesting question is whether, beyond providing policy
mandates, these rulings provided political lessons to policymakers about new
possibilities in gun regulation or deregulation. In particular, we ask whether the
courts liberated lawmakers, particularly pro-gun lawmakers, to dismantle
regulations that perhaps would not be unconstitutional but that would fit
uncomfortably in a new legal order providing some deference to individual gun
rights.
To evaluate whether Heller and progeny had such a learning effect, we
assess three hypotheses:
H1) that lawmakers would cease introducing handgun-ban bills;
H2) that lawmakers would move to repeal state bans on “junk guns”;
H3) that lawmakers would enact more gun rights provisions at the state
level.
A. State Handgun Ban Proposals
The Heller Court found that the District of Columbia’s effective ban on
handguns unconstitutionally infringed individuals’ Second Amendment rights.83
Although Heller applied only to the District of Columbia, a unique federal
district, the Court’s holding cast grave doubt on the constitutionality of all such

82
83

HECLO, supra note 27, at 306; Hall, supra note 27, at 277–78; Pierson, supra note 24, at 612.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).

GOSS&LACOMBE_8.27.20

894

8/27/2020 5:20 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69:881

bans nationwide.84 Two years later, the McDonald Court affirmed this
supposition.85 Thus, if these cases were to have an impact on lawmaker agendas,
the most direct effect would be on efforts to ban handguns. We would expect to
see a decrease in handgun-ban bills after 2008, and an even more precipitous
drop after 2010, as lawmakers learn that such bills would be likely to draw, and
highly unlikely to survive, a court challenge.
To assess whether Heller and its progeny affected the agendas of state
lawmakers, we compiled an original dataset of bills introduced in state
legislatures to ban handguns.86 We interpreted the term “ban” broadly to include
blanket bans on handguns (such as S.B. 46, introduced in the Tennessee Senate
in 1989), on “cop killer” handguns (such as S.B. 2113, introduced in the
Massachusetts Senate in June 2005), and on guns deemed unsafe (such as A.B.
2245, introduced in the California State Assembly in February 2016). Figure 1
shows the number of handgun-ban bills introduced in the eighteen years before
Heller, in 2008 (when the ruling came down), and in the nine years afterward—
as well as the number of states in which such bills were introduced.

COOK & GOSS, supra note 78, at 95.
McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010).
86
We compiled these bills from LexisNexis State Capital. We used these search terms: [handgun] AND
[prohibit OR ban] for the years 1990–2017. (The State Capital database has since migrated to a platform called
State Net.) The dataset includes bills regarding so-called junk guns or other handguns meeting certain criteria,
as well as bills seeking a broad handgun ban via other entities (e.g., Congress, state referenda). These are the
types of “ban” bills that might have been constitutionally suspect under Heller. If we were to see a feedback
effect, we would expect to see it in the introduction of these types of bills. At the same time, our dataset excluded
bills that, in our reading of Heller, would have been presumptively constitutional, including bans on possession
by or transfers to minors, felons, or other generally prohibited people; bans on place-based carry restrictions
(e.g., schools, bars); bans on undetectable firearms; and bans on more than one handgun purchase per month.
This data is on file with the author.
84
85
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The Figure is consistent with a slight Heller effect—there are no handgunban bills of any type in the first seven years after the ruling. However, this
finding must be placed in context: in the two decades prior to Heller, very few
such bills were introduced (typically 0–3 per year), and then only in a handful
of states (0–3 states per year, with 11 states represented over the 29-year period).
These bills constituted either a nonexistent or negligible fraction of legislative
proposals introduced in any given state in any given year. If Heller reoriented
lawmakers’ policy agendas, this data series suggests that this reorientation was
not especially profound. Put simply, state lawmakers introduce thousands of
bills each year. Handgun ban legislation was so rare by 2008 that with or without
Heller, its disappearance thereafter might have passed without note.
B. Junk Gun Bans
“Junk guns” is a colloquial term used to describe a variety of inexpensive,
poorly made handguns that may be at elevated risk of misfiring or being used in
crime.87 These guns, sometimes called Saturday Night Specials, have been

87
Eva H. Shine, Comment, The Junk Gun Predicament: Answers Do Exist, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1183, 1183,
1185–86 (1998).
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targets of state and federal regulation at least since the 1970s.88 The Heller ruling
did not specifically address the constitutionality of this category of handgun, but
to pro-gun lawmakers the ruling might have provided a political opening to
revisit the constitutional status of existing junk-gun bans.
Using data compiled by Michael Siegel and colleagues at Boston
University’s School of Public Health, we assembled a time series of state junkgun bans from 1991 (eighteen years before Heller) through 2018 (ten years
after).89 The series shows that within that time frame, the number of states
having such bans rose from five (1991) to seven (2001), then dropped to six bans
four years after Heller. The story is similar to that of handgun-ban bills above.
These laws were rare before Heller and rare afterward. This legislative stasis is
hard to square with a Heller effect.
C. Pro-Gun Policies
The National Rifle Association, the nation’s largest and most politically
prominent gun rights organization, has long opposed stricter gun laws.90
However, since the late 1970s, when a hardline faction took over the
organization’s board, it has developed a strategic approach to relax gun laws on
both the federal and (especially) state levels.91 The organization has selected a
handful of top priority policy reforms and, taking advantage of its federated
structure, gone from state to state to lobby for their enactment.92 Beyond the
NRA, many states have highly politicized gun rights organizations that are often
to the right of the NRA and equally capable of mobilizing members for political
action.93 These forces have traditionally held advantages in many state
legislatures (which frequently favor rural areas, where many gun owners live)
and have not been matched by a countermovement of local gun control
activists.94
These political dynamics allow us to assess two competing hypotheses. If
courts have learning effects on policymakers, we might expect the number of
pro-gun laws to rise in the year or two after Heller. If the courts have no such
See David T. Hardy & John Stompoly, Of Arms and the Law, 51 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 62, 113 (1974).
Michael Siegel, State Firearms Laws, ST. FIREARM LAWS DATABASE, http://www.statefirearmlaws.
org/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2020).
90
Lacombe, supra note 25, at 45.
91
COOK & GOSS, supra note 78; GOSS, supra note 79.
92
COOK & GOSS, supra note 78, at 193–94, 199–200; ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL
125 (2018).
93
COOK & GOSS, supra note 78, at 191–93.
94
GOSS, supra note 79, at 172–73.
88
89
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effects, we might expect to see an uninterrupted trend line. Figure 2, compiled
by Michael Siegel and his colleagues, provides a rough account of the diffusion
of policies prioritized by pro-gun organizations from 1991 to 2016.95 (Note the
counts are cumulative in the sense that they represent laws on the books in any
given year, not laws enacted in any given year.) As the chart shows, the number
of states with pro-gun provisions had been increasing at a modest and
occasionally rapid pace before 2008, and this pace did not become visibly more
rapid after Heller.

Although these patterns again appear inconsistent with a pronounced Heller
effect, we offer one caveat. The number of states adopting “permitless concealed
carry” laws—which allow people entitled to own guns to carry them concealed
in public without a license—has ticked up in the years since Heller.96 The year
2009 appeared to be a switch point, albeit a minor one, for permitless carry—
described by gun rights forces as “constitutional carry.” The elimination of
concealed carry licensing has been a key policy goal of pro-gun organizations
95
Michael Siegel et al., Firearm-Related Laws in All 50 US States, 1991–2016, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1122, 1127 fig.2 (2017) (adapted and used with permission).
96
Permitless Concealed Carry, GIFFORDS L. CTR., https://lawcenter.giffords.org/wp-content/uploads/
2017/10/Permitless-Carry-Factsheet-1.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2020).
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and the focus of sustained state-level advocacy.97 Heller, which did not deal
explicitly with carrying but implied that bans would be constitutionally suspect,
may have encouraged activists to take a more assertive approach to the
dismantling of license-to-carry laws. However, it may also be the case that the
timing of permitless carry’s advancement vis-a-vis Heller was coincidental
insofar as this policy reform represents the logical next step in a long effort to
deregulate guns in public spaces—an effort that began many years before Heller.
With some possible modest exceptions, we find that Heller and progeny had
little direct impact on state gun laws beyond those at issue in the rulings
themselves.
IV. POLICY FEEDBACK: EFFECTS ON POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
Many of the most important recent works on policy feedback have focused
on political engagement at the level of the individual, and to a lesser extent, at
the level of organizations and movements.98 Individuals, organizations, and
movements are logical places to look for feedback effects in regimes (such as
the United States) that have decentralized systems of interest group pluralism
and strong constitutional protections for political speech and association.
Rosenberg’s case studies, particularly of Brown v. Board of Education, pursued
this intuition. Here we consider organization-level feedback effects, and in the
next Section we consider effects at the level of the mass public.
Both the Heller and McDonald cases inspired a good deal of political
engagement from organizations and individuals in policy communities
concerned with gun rights and gun control. In Heller, for example, sixty-seven
amicus curiae briefs were submitted on behalf of scores of organizations,
individuals, and networks of experts.99 Advocates for the gun rights position
(70% of briefs) included gun owner associations, think tanks and litigation
organizations, the U.S. Vice President and conservative members of Congress,
certain states, former government officials and military officers, and civil
liberties groups.100 On the gun regulation or neutral side (30% of briefs) were
gun control advocacy organizations, cities, liberal members of Congress, civil
97
Chris W. Cox, Working Together to Save the Second Amendment Part II: State Success Stories, NRAILA (May 21, 2019), https://www.nraila.org/articles/20190521/working-together-to-save-the-second-amendmentpart-ii-state-success-stories.
98
See Andrea Louise Campbell, Policy Makes Mass Politics, 15 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 333, 351 (2012);
Mettler & SoRelle, supra note 24, at 104; Mettler & Soss, supra note 24, at 60.
99
District of Columbia v. Heller Case Files, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/
cases/dc-v-heller/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2020).
100
Id.
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rights groups, academics, lawyers, and pediatricians.101 In short, Heller drew
broad organizational engagement while under consideration. This level of
institutional engagement—coupled with the salience of gun violence, gun
ownership, and the “great American gun war”102—gives us reason to expect that
Heller and its progeny might produce organization-level feedback effects. We
assess three hypotheses along these lines:
H4) that the rulings changed the policy agendas of gun regulation groups;
H5) that the rulings altered the political strategies of pro-gun groups;
H6) that the rulings changed the organizational capacity of both pro-gun
and gun regulation organizations.
A. Policy Agendas of Gun Regulation Groups: Legislation
The politics of gun regulation is defined by scores of local, state, and national
advocacy organizations. Thus, if policy shapes politics, it is logical to look to
advocacy organizations’ political strategies for evidence of a Heller effect. We
examine the policy agendas of the three dominant national gun regulation groups
before and immediately after the two-year span of time encompassing the Heller
and McDonald rulings.103 These groups are the Coalition to Stop Gun Violence,
Mayors Against Illegal Guns (a precursor to Everytown for Gun Safety), and the
Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence. We assess whether the sorts of
policies prioritized by these groups changed following Heller and its progeny,
specifically with regard to policies deemed unconstitutional by the Court.
We first assessed the Coalition to Stop Gun Violence. Prior to Heller, the
Coalition emphasized three sets of policy priorities. The first—labeled “Closing
Illegal Gun Markets”—focused on enacting policies that would make it more
difficult for individuals prohibited from owning guns to buy them on the
secondary market.104 Such proposals included extending background checks to
cover sales made at gun shows, passing gun licensing and registration
requirements, making it easier to trace guns used in crimes, and banning
“assault” weapons.105 The second—“International Arms Trade”—focused on
Id.
B. Bruce-Briggs, The Great American Gun War, 45 PUB. INT. 37, 37 (1976).
103
We used the WayBackMachine Internet Archive, a repository of no-longer-live webpages, to
reconstruct the pre- and post-Heller agendas of these organizations.
104
Closing Illegal Gun Markets, COALITION TO STOP GUN VIOLENCE (Dec. 8, 2007), http:/www.csgv.org/
site/c.muLYJ7MMKrH/b.2819031/k.8F4D/Closing_Illegal_Gun_Markets.htm [https://web.archive.org/web/
20071208163028/http://www.csgv.org/site/c.muLYJ7MMKrH/b.2819031/k.8F4D/Closing_Illegal_Gun_Mark
ets.htm].
105
Id.
101
102
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preventing the flow of firearms to criminal groups across international
borders.106 Finally, the third—“Guns, Democracy and Freedom”—was a bit
broader, but focused on preventing employees from being able to bring guns to
work, opposing laws giving immunity to gun manufacturers for accidents and
crimes committed with weapons they produced, and fighting the spread of what
the Coalition describes as “shoot first laws” (more commonly known as “standyour-ground laws”).107 In addition, the “Guns, Democracy, and Freedom”
initiative included a defense of Washington, D.C.’s gun laws during the period
in which Heller was pending.108
To what extent did the Coalition’s policy goals shift after Heller and later
McDonald? The answer is, not much. In the months after Heller, the Coalition’s
website listed a broadly similar set of policy priorities, just slightly
rearranged.109 The group acknowledged the Heller decision and noted that it
would assist the city with revising its gun laws to be in accordance with the
Supreme Court’s ruling.110 By early 2011—after McDonald—the group’s policy
priorities still had not shifted substantially.111 The Coalition again acknowledged
the Court’s decision but did not signal that it would alter its agenda in any way
as a result.112 The absence of a shift is no doubt due to the fact that the Coalition’s
pre-2008 priorities were presumptively constitutional even under the Heller

106
International Arms Trade, COALITION TO STOP GUN VIOLENCE (Dec. 9, 2007), http://www.csgv.
org/site/c.muLYJ7MMKrH/b.2820489/k.7959/International_Arms_Trade.htm. [https://web.archive.org/web/
20071209201802/http://www.csgv.org/site/c.muLYJ7MMKrH/b.2820489/k.7959/International_Arms_Trade.h
tm]
107
Guns, Democracy, and Freedom, COALITION TO STOP GUN VIOLENCE (Feb. 7, 2008), http://www.csgv.
org/site/c.muLYJ7MMKrH/b.2820491/k.7DFD/Guns_Democracy_and_Freedom.htm.
[https://web.archive.
org/web/20080207130218/http://www.csgv.org/site/c.muLYJ7MMKrH/b.2820491/k.7DFD/Guns_Democracy
_and_Freedom.htm].
108
Democracy and DC Gun Laws, COALITION TO STOP GUN VIOLENCE (Feb. 26, 2008), http://www.csgv.
org/site/c.muLYJ7MMKrH/b.2821475/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20080226103545/http://www.csgv.org/
site/c.muLYJ7MMKrH/b.2821475/].
109
Issues & Campaigns, COALITION TO STOP GUN VIOLENCE (Apr. 12, 2009), http://www.csgv.org/
site/c.pmL5JnO7KzE/b.3509211/k.AA0C/Issues__Campaigns.htm [https://web.archive.org/web/20090412053
823/http://www.csgv.org/site/c.pmL5JnO7KzE/b.3509211/k.AA0C/Issues__Campaigns.htm].
110
Democracy and DC Gun Laws, COALITION TO STOP GUN VIOLENCE (Nov. 27, 2008), http://www.csgv.
org/site/c.pmL5JnO7KzE/b.3509333/k.5FD1/Democracy_and_DC_Gun_Laws.htm [https://web.archive.org/
web/20081127024105/http://www.csgv.org/site/c.pmL5JnO7KzE/b.3509333/k.5FD1/Democracy_and_DC_G
un_Laws.htm].
111
Issues & Campaigns, COALITION TO STOP GUN VIOLENCE (Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.csgv.org/issuesand-campaigns [https://web.archive.org/web/20110203051653/http://www.csgv.org/issues-and-campaigns].
112
Supreme Court and the Second Amendment, COALITION TO STOP GUN VIOLENCE (Feb. 3, 2011),
http://www.csgv.org/issues-and-campaigns/guns-democracy-and-freedom/supreme-court-and-the-secondamendment [https://web.archive.org/web/20110203061958/http://www.csgv.org/issues-and-campaigns/gunsdemocracy-and-freedom/supreme-court-and-the-second-amendment].
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court’s reading of the Second Amendment.113 The Coalition, which was founded
as the National Coalition to Ban Handguns, had long since ceased advocating
such a policy goal.114
We also assessed Mayors Against Illegal Guns, which was founded in 2006
and held its first summit in April of that year.115 At the summit, hosted by New
York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Boston Mayor Thomas Menino, the
assembled mayors established guiding principles for the organization, which
focused on punishing individuals and gun dealers who “possess, use, and traffic
in illegal guns,” making it easier for cities to trace guns used in crimes, and
building collaborations between cities that would assist in these objectives.116
These priorities indicate that the organization was careful to place its focus
on illegal guns, and none of the principles advocated for legislation that would
eventually be precluded by Heller or McDonald. Indeed, in a press release
following the event, Mayor Bloomberg explicitly stated: “This is not a question
of ideologies or a referendum on the Second Amendment. This is about public
safety and making sure that illegal guns never make their way into the hands of
criminals and onto our streets.”117
At its 2007 summit in Washington, D.C., the group chose to emphasize the
importance of the “Tiahrt Amendments,” which have been attached to
Department of Justice appropriations bills since 2003 and restrict access to
federal data that may be useful for tracking illegal guns and their dealers.118 The
featured state and local legislation on the Mayors group’s website as of 2007 did
not advocate any proposals that would ban weapons and could potentially be
deemed unconstitutional post-Heller.119
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008).
GOSS, supra note 79, at 153, 197.
115
Mayor Bloomberg, Boston Mayor Menino and Mayors from Around the United States Stand Up
Together in the Fight Against Illegal Guns, OFFICIAL WEBSITE N.Y.C. (Apr. 26, 2006), https://www1.nyc.gov/
office-of-the-mayor/news/129-06/mayor-bloomberg-boston-mayor-menino-mayors-around-united-statesstand-up-together-in#/1.
116
Id.; Coalition Principles, MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GUNS (July 2, 2007), http:/www.
mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/html/about/principles.shtml [https://web.archive.org/web/20070702003247/http:/
www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/html/about/principles.shtml].
117
Mayor Bloomberg, supra note 115.
118
Federal Legislation, MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GUNS (July 2, 2007), http:/www.
mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/html/federal/federal.shtml [https://web.archive.org/web/20070702090924/http://
www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/html/federal/federal.shtml]. Gun rights advocates view these amendments
as a way to protect the privacy of gun owners and guard against the creation of a national gun registry. Tiahrt
Amendments, GIFFORDS L. CTR., https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/federal-law/other-laws/tiahrtamendments/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2020).
119
State & Local Legislation, MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GUNS (July 3, 2007), http://www.
113
114
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Mayors’ agenda had expanded a bit by the post-Heller period, but not in
ways that seem likely to be related to the ruling. In addition to advocating
elimination of the Tiahrt Amendments, the organization’s federal legislative
positions as of December 2008 emphasized expanding background checks,
precluding individuals on terror watch lists from being allowed to buy guns,
preventing gun dealers that were being shut down due to illegal sales from being
able to sell the rest of their inventory, and requiring gun dealers to conduct
background checks of their employees.120 The organization’s state and local
priorities at this time focused on requirements to report lost/stolen firearms,
creation of gun offender registries, establishment of regional gun data-sharing
programs, and expanded mental health reporting.121 As in prior years, these
policies focused more on enforcement of existing guns laws than on establishing
the sorts of gun-ban policies deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
These priorities had not changed in substantial ways by the end of 2011, after
the McDonald ruling.122
Finally, we also examined the policy agenda of the Brady Campaign. Prior
to Heller, Brady emphasized expanding background checks, closing gaps in the
National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), and requiring gun
manufacturers to “child-proof” guns.123 As of the beginning of 2009—after
Heller—Brady’s website continued to push for expanding background checks,
enacting policies to help law enforcement agencies to solve gun-related crimes,
removing the Tiahrt Amendments, banning individuals on the terror watchlist
from buying guns, and opposing laws that would expand individuals’ ability to
buy and carry guns.124 In early 2011—post-McDonald—Brady continued to
mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/html/local/local.shtml
[https://web.archive.org/web/20070703121911/http://
www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/html/local/local.shtml].
120
Federal Legislation, MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GUNS (Dec. 26, 2008), http://www.
mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/html/federal/federal.shtml [https://web.archive.org/web/20081226081323/http://
www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/html/federal/federal.shtml].
121
State & Local Legislation, MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GUNS (Dec. 27, 2008), http://www.
mayorsagainstillegalguns.org:80/html/local/local.shtml [https://web.archive.org/web/20081227010923/http://
www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org:80/html/local/local.shtml].
122
State & Local Legislation, MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GUNS (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.
mayorsagainstillegalguns.org:80/html/local/local.shtml [https://web.archive.org/web/20110902003337/http://
mayorsagainstillegalguns.org:80/html/local/local.shtml] (describing the group’s state and local policy agenda);
Federal Legislation, MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GUNS (July 23, 2011), http://www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.
org/html/federal/federal.shtml
[https://web.archive.org/web/20110723121453/http://www.
mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/html/federal/federal.shtml] (describing the group’s federal policy agenda).
123
State and Federal Legislation, BRADY CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE (June 26, 2007), http://
www.bradycampaign.org/legislation/
[https://web.archive.org/web/20070626051410/http://www.brady
campaign.org/legislation/].
124
State and Federal Legislation, BRADY CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE (Jan. 18, 2009), http://
www.bradycampaign.org/legislation/
[https://web.archive.org/web/20090118014557/http://www.brady
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emphasize expanded background checks and child safety measures, along with
provisions to crack down on gun dealers who violate the law.125
When considered together, the policy agendas of the three most prominent
gun-regulation advocacy groups show little evidence of a Heller effect. In all
three cases, this result is mostly because the groups’ pre-Heller agendas were
relatively moderate and did not include policies that would have been affected
by the Supreme Court’s decisions.
B. Political Strategies of Pro-Gun Groups: Litigation
Even if Heller and its progeny had little effect on pro-regulation
organizations, it is possible that the rulings might have affected the strategies of
pro-gun groups. We examine two strategies, selected because there is reason to
believe that they would have been especially responsive to pro-gun-rights
rulings.
The first of these strategies is Second Amendment litigation. We expect that
Heller and its progeny will have a positive effect on the use of litigation as a
political strategy. Although less common than many other policy-reform
strategies, litigation is commonly pursued by interest groups across the political
and issue spectrum.126 The strategy’s popularity may stem in part from the fact
that federal law provides tax preferences for nonprofit organizations that seek
change through the courts. Legal defense funds and other public-interest
litigation organizations may qualify as public charities under Section 501(c)(3)
of the Internal Revenue Code, entitling them to receive grants from charitable
foundations and tax-deductible donations from individuals.127 By contrast,
nonprofit groups whose primary strategy is legislative advocacy may not accept
foundation grants (except in carefully supervised circumstances128), nor can
individual donors take a tax deduction for their contributions. Nonprofit groups
campaign.org/legislation/].
125
Legislation, BRADY CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE (Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.
bradycampaign.org/legislation/
[https://web.archive.org/web/20110113193840/http://www.bradycampaign.
org/legislation/].
126
JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE INTEREST GROUP SOCIETY 175–77 (3d ed. 1997); WALKER, supra note 25, at
109; Paul M. Collins, Jr., Interest Groups in the Judicial Arena, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTEREST GROUP
POLITICS 221 (M. Grossmann ed., 2014); Kay Lehman Schlozman & John T. Tierney, More of the Same:
Washington Pressure Group Activity in a Decade of Change, 45 J. POL. 351, 357 tbl.1 (1983).
127
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., LITIGATION BY IRC 501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS (1984); see also INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., PUB. NO. 526: CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS 3 (2019) [hereinafter PUB. NO. 526]; INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., PUB. NO. 4221-PF: COMPLIANCE GUIDE FOR 501(C)(3) PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS 3 (2014)
[hereinafter PUB. NO. 4221-PF].
128
See PUB. NO. 4221-PF, supra note 127, at 5–8 (discussing expenditure responsibility).
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whose primary mission is supporting candidates or parties, or otherwise
influencing elections, cannot receive money from foundations; and private
donations are not deductible and are publicly reportable (above a certain
level).129 Thus, of the three major strategies for reforming public policy—
elections, advocacy, and litigation—litigation receives the most generous
treatment under the law. Public policy creates a financial incentive structure for
policy entrepreneurs to pursue social change through the courts.130
For these reasons and others that are specific to the gun case, we expect
Heller and its progeny’s feedback effect on the use of the litigation strategy to
be positive. First, Heller and McDonald recognized a broad “new” individual
right but did so in the context of fairly narrow rulings (striking down anomalous
bans on handguns kept by law-abiding gun owners in the home).131 To put it
bluntly, the cases produced landmark rulings that would have a direct effect on
very few laws. This disconnect—a big precedent with few effects—would be
expected to invite litigation to align the rulings’ impact with their symbolic
import. Second, Heller was focused squarely on handgun bans; it mentioned a
handful of other “presumptively” constitutional firearms laws in passing,132 but
left many other gun laws unaddressed. In so doing, the ruling invited pro-gun
litigants to see how expansively the courts would interpret Heller. Third, the
Heller and McDonald decisions did not specify the level of scrutiny that courts
should use in evaluating the constitutionality of gun laws. The level of scrutiny
applied is critical to determining whether a law stands or falls. Thus, in addition
to the law itself, gun groups might have pursued litigation to establish a level of
scrutiny that would make gun regulations as difficult as possible for their
defenders to justify as constitutional.
To assess this litigation hypothesis, we compiled a dataset of state and
federal cases in which a gun law was challenged on Second Amendment
grounds. These cases included, for example, challenges to state and federal laws

129
PUB. NO. 526, supra note 127, at 6; PUB. NO. 4221-PF, supra note 127, at 6–7; FED. ELECTION COMM’N,
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION CAMPAIGN GUIDE: CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES AND COMMITTEES 90
(2014).
130
GOSS, supra note 25, at 131.
131
McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635
(2008).
132
Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 (noting that nothing in the opinion “should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions
and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms”). The accompanying footnote states: “We identify these
presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive.” Id. at
627 n.26.
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barring certain categories of people (e.g., felons, domestic abusers, drug addicts)
from possessing a firearm, challenges to state restrictions on the right to carry a
concealed weapon in public, state gun licensing laws, firearm taxes, and placebased restrictions on firearm use, among other issues. These cases were
numerous, and given time constraints, we present data from three years: 2003
(seven years before McDonald), 2010 (the year McDonald was decided), and
2017 (seven years after McDonald).133 These three years encompassed 331
cases. Figure 3 shows the trend, which as hypothesized represents a departure
from the “null effects” narrative. There does seem to be a positive effect on
Second Amendment litigation in the post-Heller legal environment.

To the extent that the post-Heller litigation was brought by organizations on
behalf of individuals, we would infer a feedback effect on organizational

133
NEXIS UNI, https://www.nexisuni.com (follow “Legal” hyperlink and select U.S. cases; search “Second
Amendment challenge”; then under the timeline, enter “01/01/2003” into the start date and “12/31/2017” into
the end date; then follow “Select multiple” hyperlink and select all federal cases and state cases at the appellate
level). Cases are counted only once—that is, a case that moves through the district, appeals, and supreme courts
would count as one case, not three. We have excluded “as applied” challenges, in which individuals convicted
of gun law violations seek to overturn these convictions, or those that relied upon them, but not to overturn the
law entirely. We also have excluded cases brought by individuals whose Second Amendment complaint
constitutes an extraneous claim in a case brought on other grounds.
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strategy and, perhaps, on resource allocation decisions. Because these lawsuits
need to be financed, we likewise might infer that Heller and its progeny also had
a feedback effect on funders interested in gun issues. Future research might
investigate the degree of gun groups’ and funders’ engagement in this litigation.
C. Frameworks of Gun Rights Discourse
Although gun control groups did not agree with the Heller ruling, some gun
control leaders thought it might contain a silver lining. By assuring law-abiding
gun owners that their handguns were constitutionally protected, the thinking
went, Heller and its progeny would remove the threat of confiscation and
thereby calm political discourse.134 For decades, the NRA had relied on the
“slippery slope” argument to create or dramatize policy threats, which proved
successful in mobilizing gun owners into politics.135 To gun control groups, the
slippery slope argument—that any modest proposal would put America on the
road to tyranny—forestalled political bargaining and eliminated the possibility
that lawmakers could enact reasonable gun legislation supported by polling
majorities. If gun rights groups could no longer plausibly assert that legislation
would lead to tyranny, perhaps the parties to the great American gun war could
call a truce, and good-faith armistice talks could begin.
Did Heller and progeny shift gun rights discourse by influencing the range
of plausible claims? To assess this question, we coded uses of slippery-slope
style arguments in editorials published in the NRA’s flagship magazine,
American Rifleman. The examined editorials, typically written by the
organization’s chief executive, cover a nine-year window (2004–2012) centered
on 2008, when the Court decided Heller.136 As Figure 4 shows, there was a slight
decline in threat rhetoric after Heller, and because we considered the entire
population of editorials, this decline is not due to sampling error.

Helmke, supra note 19.
GOSS, supra note 79, at 172–73; Matthew J. Lacombe, The Political Weaponization of Gun Owners:
The National Rifle Association’s Cultivation, Dissemination, and Use of a Group Social Identity, 81 J. POL.
1342, 1353 (2019); Lacombe, supra note 25, at 142.
136
The Court issued its Heller ruling on June 26, 2008. Heller, 554 U.S. at 570. American Rifleman first
wrote about the ruling in the August 2008 issue. We coded each of the 108 editorials published from 2004
through 2012 in terms of whether it argues that particular gun control policies or political outcomes (e.g.,
elections) will eventually lead to gun bans. We coded two different conceptions of gun bans. First, we focused
on the use of slippery-slope arguments that end with universal bans on the ownership of guns—that is, the total
elimination of the right to own firearms in the United States. Second, we focused on the use of slippery slope
arguments that end with partial gun bans or additional controls on firearms that are more severe than those
currently being debated. Each of the figures depicts the proportion of editorials published pre- and post-Heller
that use these sorts of arguments; the figures include 95% confidence intervals.
134
135
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However, even with the modest dip, the substantive takeaway is that the
slippery slope argument remained a prominent framework. For years it had
proved critical to the construction of a politicized gun owner identity.137 Part of
this identity involved gun owners’ understanding of themselves as a besieged
community.138 Policy threats to the gun owner identity had proved effective in
mobilizing NRA members into politics.139 The court rulings did not
fundamentally alter this dynamic.
Using the same data, we examined more closely the substantive claims
contained in the slippery-slope narrative. We ask: Where, according to the NRA,
does this slippery slope eventually lead? Here we see a possible effect of Heller.
As Figures 5 and 6 show, the editorials shifted from a claim that gun regulation
would lead to a universal ban on firearms (the dominant pre-Heller framing) to
a claim that gun regulation would lead to partial gun bans or other sorts of future
restrictions (the dominant post-Heller framing).

137
138
139

Lacombe, supra note 25, at 22, 37.
Id. at 139–41.
Lacombe, supra note 135, at 1352–53.
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Taken together, these figures suggest that the NRA updated its threat
framework to accommodate the Heller and McDonald rulings. In the new
discourse, there was perhaps a limit on how far the slippery slope could
descend—but it remained slippery. Court rulings that might have undermined
the political power of these mobilizing frameworks appear to have just
reoriented the rhetoric toward slightly different types of policy threats.
D. Organizational Capacity of Gun-Related Organizations
Public policies can affect the capacity of organizations to engage in politics.
Policies may expand or shrink organizations’ financial resources; provide or
remove political opportunities for membership growth; or offer other goods such
as data, access to convenings and networks, and authoritative validation.140
Public policy has operated on or through gun-related groups via all of these
mechanisms.141 Here, we consider financial and membership resources.
To track the relative financial resources pre- and post-Heller, we examined
the informational tax returns of three leading legislative advocacy organizations,
organized under Section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code, and their
charitable affiliates, organized under Section 501(c)(3).142 These organizations
were the NRA (and the NRA Foundation), the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun
Violence (and the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence), and the Coalition to
Stop Gun Violence (and the Educational Fund to Stop Gun Violence). The
Figure captures the combined revenue of the (c)(4) and the related (c)(3) for each
entity. The NRA’s resources have been divided by ten to fit on the scale.

140
GOSS, supra note 79, at 73–90; Campbell, supra note 98, at 337; Mettler & SoRelle, supra note 24, at
110–13; Mettler & Soss, supra note 24, at 62. See generally Goss, Barnes & Rose, supra note 25.
141
GOSS, supra note 79, at 73–90; SPITZER, supra note 92, at 132–34.
142
Nonprofit organizations recognized under Sections 501(c)(3) or 501(c)(4) that have normal annual
revenues of at least $50,000 are required to file these informational tax returns, known as Form 990, each year.
We obtained these forms from the online repository Guidestar.org (now Candid.org).
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As the Figure shows, Heller appears to have had no discernible effect on
organization revenues on either side of the gun debate. The flat or downward
slope observed before Heller continued afterward.
Of course, it is possible that these lines would have looked different in the
absence of Heller. Perhaps the NRA’s revenues would have held steady longer
instead of declining; perhaps the gun control groups’ revenues would have
ticked up a bit. Such counterfactuals are unmeasurable and ultimately
unknowable. That said, it is reasonable to infer from the data that if Heller had
produced a major independent impact on organizational revenues, this effect
must have been offset by one or more other major forces to produce the observed
(largely flat) trend lines. If Heller mattered, what offsetting forces might have
mattered enough to obscure the ruling’s effect? Two plausible possibilities
present themselves: (1) the Great Recession and (2) the election of Democratic
President Barack Obama and a Democratic Congress. Theory tells us that both
events would have been expected to produce a positive effect on NRA revenues.
Both the recession and the election of a unified Democratic government (headed
by the first African-American president) were easily framed as threats to gun
owner rights, which we would expect to produce increased revenues flowing to
the NRA. Of course, the recession also reduced many people’s disposable
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income, which would have been expected to produce a revenue loss. Because
NRA revenues declined not only during the worst of the recession, but also
through 2012, when the worst of the recession was over, we feel confident in
our conclusion that Heller had little if any effect on organizational revenues.
The uptick in revenues occurred in 2012–2013, especially for the NRA but
also for the two gun control groups. Press accounts suggest that these increases
were the result of the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting, which occurred
in mid-December 2012.143 The shooting claimed the lives of twenty first-graders
and six educators, traumatized and mobilized gun control sympathizers, and
pushed gun policy reform to the top of the congressional agenda, as well as that
of many state legislatures.144 While organizational-revenue data presented here
do not allow for a fine-grained analysis, the patterns are consistent with
Rosenberg’s conclusion that litigation is a less potent force than politics in
spurring political participation.
A second measure of organizational capacity is membership. Membership is
valuable because lawmakers are accountable to voters for their jobs and thus are
attentive to organizations that can mobilize large numbers of people.145 Mass
membership organizations also have played a key role in influencing the
development and passage of major social legislation.146 Indeed, organizations
frequently cite the size of their membership and its policy sophistication to
establish their authority before lawmakers.147 However, in many policy
domains, mass membership organizations have faded, giving way to interest
groups led by professionals without an organized grassroots base.148 Thus,
143
Alana Abramson, Membership in Gun Groups Is Spiking After the Florida Shooting, TIME (Mar. 2,
2018, 4:20 PM), https://time.com/5176471/national-rifle-association-membership-florida-shooting/; Maggie
Astor, Newtown Wasnʼt an End for Gun Control. It Was a Beginning., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/29/us/politics/newtown-parkland-guns.html. See generally Kristin A. Goss,
Whatever Happened to the ‘Missing Movement’? Gun Control Politics Over Two Decades of Change, in GUN
STUDIES: INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES TO POLITICS, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 136 (Jennifer Carlson, Kristin
A. Goss & Harel Shapira eds., 2018).
144
Reid Wilson, Seven Years After Sandy Hook, Politics of Guns Has Changed, HILL (Dec. 14, 2019, 6:00
AM),
https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/474479-seven-years-after-sandy-hook-the-politics-of-gunshas-changed.
145
Jeff Stein, The NRA Is a Powerful Political Force—But Not Because of Its Money, VOX (Oct. 5, 2017,
1:40 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/10/5/16430684/nra-congress-money-no. See
generally GOSS, supra note 25.
146
EDWIN AMENTA, WHEN MOVEMENTS MATTER: THE TOWNSEND PLAN AND THE RISE OF SOCIAL
SECURITY 24 (2006); THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 76 (1992).
147
GOSS, supra note 25, at 26.
148
Id. at 156; THEDA SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY: FROM MEMBERSHIP TO MANAGEMENT IN
AMERICAN CIVIC LIFE 199–200 (2003).
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organizations that can retain and mobilize a mass base have political advantages.
Recent research has shown, for example, that lawmakers afford outsized
deference to citizens who show up and make noise, even if they do not represent
the median voter in the lawmaker’s district.149 Thus, if court rulings are capable
of influencing the size or enthusiasm of an organization’s membership, they
could have potentially important policy feedback effects.
With respect to Heller and related rulings, assessing the feedback effects on
membership capacity is complicated. To our knowledge, there is no consistent,
valid, and reliable measure of membership in gun control groups over time. This
deficiency relates to the observation above that many organizations have moved
from a model of influence based on mass memberships to a model based on
professional experts funded by elite donors—what Theda Skocpol terms the
evolution from “membership to management.”150 However, this insight gives us
confidence that the financial trends presented above accurately capture the
Heller effect on gun control groups’ “membership”—in this case, the non-effect.
On the gun rights side, the data are more accessible. Members of the NRA
are allowed to choose one of the organization’s official magazines to receive as
a benefit of membership.151 Magazine subscriptions are reported to the Alliance
for Audited Media (AAM).152 The Alliance certifies magazine-circulation
figures for the benefit of advertisers, who typically pay rates based on the
number of potential readers the ad might reach and thus need assurance that the
readership figures are accurate. The AAM makes magazines’ aggregate
circulation figures publicly available. In the case of the NRA, these circulation
figures provide a reasonable proxy for total membership. Likewise, the trends in
total NRA magazine subscriptions provide a reasonable proxy for the trends in
NRA membership.

149
David E. Broockman & Christopher Skovron, Bias in Perceptions of Public Opinion Among Political
Elites, 112 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 542, 544 (2018); Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Matto Mildenberger & Leah C.
Stokes, Legislative Staff and Representation in Congress, 113 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 2 (2019).
150
SKOCPOL, supra note 148, at 127.
151
Membership, NRA, https://membership.nra.org/MultiStep/Joins?gclid=EAIaIQobChMIq4SSzLDP5w
IVzJ6zCh31-wppEAAYASAAEgI22vD_BwE (last visited Feb. 22, 2020).
There were three magazines through mid-2016—American Rifleman, American Hunter, and America’s
1st Freedom. In mid-2016, the NRA added a fourth selection—Shooting Illustrated. The circulation totals in
Figure 8 count subscriptions to Shooting Illustrated in 2017 and 2018, but not in 2016, when the magazine was
new and had not been adopted by many members. That said, the total 2016 magazine circulation figure might
slightly underestimate the NRA’s membership in that year.
152
Who We Are, ALLIANCE FOR AUDITED MEDIA, https://auditedmedia.com/about/who-we-are (last
visited Feb. 22, 2020).
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Figure 8 shows NRA magazine circulation figures from 1999–2017—a
period that encompasses roughly a decade before and a decade after the Heller
and McDonald rulings.153 The pattern is ambiguous. The uptick in membership
after 2008 (corresponding with Heller) is consistent with a Heller effect, a
recession effect, and/or an Obama/Democratic takeover effect. The dip in 2011–
2012 is also consistent with each explanation—the recession was fading, Obama
was not making any moves on gun control, and Heller had not sparked the sort
of political controversy that causes people to join advocacy groups. The post2011 pattern, in particular the 2013 (post-Sandy Hook) and 2018 (post-Parkland)
jumps in membership are consistent with the effects of mass shootings on gun
politics.

To summarize, Heller’s timing—in the midst of a great recession and an
especially consequential national election—makes it hard to assess its
independent effect on organizational memberships. Besides being unfriendly to
control advocates, Heller was not especially helpful to empirical social scientists
seeking to understand the feedback effects of court decisions on politics. Our
assessment is that Heller was reassuring to gun owners. Accustomed to
153
We are grateful to Michael Siegel, of Boston University’s School of Public Health, for sharing these
NRA magazine circulation figures with us.
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mobilizing based on policy or identity threats, this affirmational ruling probably
had little impact on gun owners’ political participation. Threats posed by
focusing events and electoral shifts likely mattered more.
Like Brown v. Board of Education and Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court’s
two gun cases—Heller and McDonald—involved a salient social issue easily
understood by the mass public. Gun control had been the topic of intense
political conflict at least since the 1960s.154 The decade leading up to Heller had
included the mass shooting at Columbine High School (1999), the largest ever
public demonstration for gun control (the Million Mom March, 2000), and the
massacre of students and instructors at Virginia Tech (at that time, the deadliest
such incident in American history, 2007). Aside from the political ramifications,
Heller and McDonald had the potential to affect a broad swath of the population.
In 2008, an estimated 35% of American households had a firearm of some type,
and about 20% had a handgun—whose prohibition by the D.C. government was
at issue in Heller.155 In sum, the gun cases stood out from the more common
types of Supreme Court cases, which involve narrow, technical matters of
concern only to small policy communities.
We lack a consistent, reliable measure of mass-level participation around
gun regulation. However, polling organizations have asked generic questions
aimed at assessing individuals’ posture toward the gun issue. For example, for
many years, the Pew Research Center asked: “What do you think is more
important—to protect the right of Americans to own guns, OR to control gun
ownership?”156 Figure 9 shows the percentage of respondents who prioritized
gun control, broken down by political party identification. As the Figure
suggests, pro-control sentiment had started to decline before the Heller ruling
was announced, in June 2008 (indicated by the vertical line). And the decline
did not visibly accelerate afterward.

GOSS, supra note 79, at 29.
Figures generated by authors from the General Social Survey’s online data tool, GSS DATA EXPLORER,
https://gssdataexplorer.norc.org/trends/Civil%20Liberties?measure=owngun (last visited Feb. 7, 2020).
156
2014 Political Polarization Survey, PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2014), https://www.people-press.org/
2014/06/12/gun-rightsgun-control/.
154
155
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The Gallup Organization’s version of the generic question asks: “In general,
do you feel that the laws covering the sale of firearms should be made more
strict, less strict, or kept as they are now?”157 The trend lines show no disruption
in 2008. In the years preceding Heller, there had been a gradual erosion in the
fraction of Americans wanting stricter laws and a concomitant rise in the fraction
wanting the status quo; the fraction wanting less strict laws was low (generally
5–10%) and stable.158 These data are consistent with the other evidence
suggesting that the court rulings did not alter mass politics.
V. COURTS, CHANGE, AND A CAVEAT
When taken together, our findings indicate that the effects of the landmark
Heller ruling have, at least to date, been rather limited. Together with McDonald,
the Heller ruling did lead to the repeal of some of the country’s most restrictive
handgun laws. Although these changes were significant, their effects were
geographically narrow, pertaining only to Washington, D.C., San Francisco, and
the Chicago area.159 Beyond the direct effects of the rulings on existing gun
policies, we also examined these rulings’ impacts on three main categories of
outcomes: (1) other handgun laws and policymaker agendas; (2) the political
capacity and strategies of pro- and anti-gun advocacy organizations; and (3)
157
158
159

Guns, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1645/guns.aspx (last visited Feb. 22, 2020).
Id.
See supra Part III.

GOSS&LACOMBE_8.27.20

916

8/27/2020 5:20 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69:881

mass attitudes about gun control. With the exception of gun rights litigation, we
find that the rulings had either miniscule or non-existent impacts on the political
and social outcomes we examined.160 Neither the hopes, nor the worries, of
advocates have borne out.
Our findings support the constrained view of the Court advanced by
Rosenberg. Notably, however, Rosenberg builds his argument around cases that
progressives hoped would spur widespread change.161 Our analysis, on the other
hand, focuses on a pair of cases that conservatives hoped would drive broader
changes aligned with their beliefs. In finding that the conservative victories
delivered by the Heller and McDonald cases were mostly symbolic, our
conclusion validates Rosenberg’s basic claim—that courts are poor substitutes
for politics as engines of change—but also suggests that hollow hopes may
bedevil conservatives as well as progressives.162
Our findings are consistent with other work finding that courts are cautious
about getting too far out in front of public opinion.163 Such caution is logical
insofar as courts, lacking both sword and purse, typically must rely on moral
suasion to ensure compliance with their rulings. The Heller and McDonald
rulings affected laws that were generally out of step with U.S. public opinion.164
If court rulings are lagging indicators of broader political dynamics, there is
reason to expect that courts will have muted feedback effects on politics writ
large. The effect of Heller and its progeny was noticeable only in the realm of
litigation and to a small extent in NRA rhetoric. Regarding litigation, the rulings
appeared to encourage more Second Amendment challenges to gun regulations,
but most of these challenges were unsuccessful.165 The feedback effect on
litigation was predictable, narrowly defined, and not especially meaningful in
terms of producing social change.166 Regarding NRA rhetoric, the rulings led to
minor semantic adjustments only; the longstanding slippery-slope argument
remained a trusty weapon in the organization’s political arsenal.167
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Beyond these minor exceptions, the pro-gun rulings had undetectable
feedback effects. The rulings appeared to produce no meaningful changes in the
resources or strategies of gun control organizations, which had long since
adjusted to the same forces weighing on the Court, or on the strategies of
lawmakers, who presumably also had bent to the shifting realities of gun
politics.168 The NRA did not receive a detectable Heller bounce in members or
revenue. In addition, the rulings had little effect on public opinion, which was a
leading indicator of the pro-gun drift in American politics. By 2008, the zone of
political conflict over guns had become demarcated in such a way as to sideline
older disputes over draconian gun bans.169 This development arguably gave the
Court the political space to issue its landmark rulings without fear of backlash
or broad resistance. A corollary to the Court’s having such political space is that
the rulings’ feedback effects would probably be minimal to nil.
Interestingly, gun rights advocates have grown alarmed by Heller and
progeny’s minimal effects on gun law and politics. The NRA and conservative
legal activists are frustrated that in their view the courts have treated the Second
Amendment as a “second-class right”—a phrase first used by Justice Clarence
Thomas referring to the lack of post-Heller rulings striking down gun laws based
on the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms.170 The conservatives’ position
is that Heller should have set off a cascade of pro-gun rulings and, presumably,
accelerated a political shift favoring the gun-rights movement.171 Such
frustrations reinforce the conclusion that courts may offer a hollow hope to
reformers not only on the left, but also on the right.
On a broader level, our findings connect the scholarly literature on policy
feedback to the study of courts. In so doing, this case study suggests that—like
other forms of public policy—court rulings may have a limited role in reshaping
politics. Political actors (including activists, politicians, and party officials)
seeking to advance a policy agenda and build durable political power can thus
learn from Heller. The case reminds us that despite courts’ attractiveness as
agents of change amid legislative gridlock and polarization, they may not be
strong substitutes for more traditional forms of political influence.
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We end with an important caveat. As we concluded this Article, the Supreme
Court dismissed the case of New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v. City
of New York, which had challenged a New York City law that had strictly
regulated the transportation of handguns.172 After the Supreme Court agreed to
hear the case, the city repealed the law in hopes of curtailing Court review; this
move led the Court to rule that the case had become moot.173 Although the
Court’s restraint in this case aligns with the argument we have made throughout
this Article, the ruling nonetheless leaves the door open to future cases. Writing
in dissent, Justice Samuel Alito—joined by Justices Neil Gorsuch and Clarence
Thomas—made clear that the Court should consider future challenges to gun
regulations on Second Amendment grounds.174 Moreover, Justice Brett
Kavanagh—despite agreeing with the majority about the case’s mootness—
wrote separately to express his openness to future challenges.175 Subsequent
rulings, therefore, could call into question the constitutionality of common state
and local laws, such as those that give law enforcement discretion in granting
concealed-carry licenses. Indeed, it is possible that future court rulings that
threaten longstanding gun control laws or open the door to gun liberalization
could produce the sorts of feedback effects that have gone largely undetected
thus far.
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